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ERISA SECTION 404(c) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES: IS
THERE AN AFFIRMATIVE FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
DISCLOSE?
Yolanda Saylest
[T]he continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by [employee benefit] plans .. .
It is... the policy [of ERISAI to protect the interest of participants in
employee benefit plans... by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants... offinancial... information... by establishingstandards of conduct, responsibility, and obligationforfiduciaries.... 2
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1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974 § 2(a), Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. Ch. 18), 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (a) (1994).
2. ERISA§ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA" or the
"Act")3 is the foundation of the United States private retirement system.
ERISA was enacted on September 2, 19744 "to strengthen and improve the
protections and interests of participants and beneficiaries" of employee
benefit plans.6
One of several concerns the• Act
° 7 was designed to address is adequate
communication to plan participants. The solution was to impose greater
fiduciary responsibility and disclosure obligations on persons controlling
employee benefit plans as well as personal liability for the breach of any
responsibility, duty, or obligation owed to the plan or plan participants

3. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Ch. 18.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
5. S. Rep. No. 93-127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838.
6. ERISA defines an "employee benefit plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." ERISA § 3(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program [that is] established or maintained.., for
the purpose of providing.., medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services
[for its participants or their beneficiaries].
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An "employee pension benefit plan" is:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program [that is] established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that... such plan, fund, or program (i) provides retirement income to
employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan,
the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of
distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
7. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4851. The
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (to whom the initial bill which resulted
in ERISA was referred) also found that the problems in the private pension field at
the time included malfeasance and maladministration, and a broad spectrum of
questions including adequacy of funding of retirement plans, plant shut-downs
and plan terminations, transferability of vested pension credits, and the establishment of certain minimum standards. See id. The Committee decided that a comprehensive legislative program was necessary "if the private pension promise is to
become a reality rather than an illusion." Id.
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ERISA limits the liability imposed on plan fiduciaries9 by providing
that plans which establish individual participant accounts and allow a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his account
exempt a fiduciary from liability for any loss or by reason of any breach
resulting from a participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
These
plans are referred to as "participant-directed account plans" or "section
12
13
404(c) plans" 2 and are commonly found in 401 (k) plans.

A.

Significance of Participant-Directed401(k) Plans
•

14

Prior to the enactment of ERISA, defined benefit Rlans were the
dominant form of retirement plan offered by employers. Since ERISA's
enactment, defined benefit plans have grown only slightly while defined
8. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4838, 4863. Prior to
the enactment of ERISA, general information regarding plan operations was reported to plan participants and beneficiaries and to the public-at-large. See id. Individual participants, however, were not provided with information regarding
benefits to which they were entitled, what circumstances would preclude a person
from obtaining benefits, procedures to be followed to obtain benefits, or the person(s) to whom the management and investment of plan funds had been entrusted. See id.
9. See infra Part II. For purposes of this article, the terms "him," "her," or "it"
are synonymous when referencing an ERISA fiduciary.
10. See infraPart III.B.
11. SeeERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. 111996).
12. See Frederick C. Kneip, Section 404(c): Basic Principles, 397 PLI/TAx, May
1997, at 43, 46.
13. 401(k) plans are so named from the section of the Internal Revenue
Code that provides for their existence and governs their operation. See 26 U.S.C. §
401(k) (1994). Basically, a 401(k) plan is an arrangement between an employee
and his employer which is part of a profit-sharing plan under which the employee
may elect to have the employer make pre-tax compensation payments as contributions to a trust under the plan on behalf of the employee, or to the employee directly in taxable compensation. See id. 401(k) plans are often also referred to as
"cash or deferred arrangements." See id. These arrangements are subject to participation and discrimination standards that are beyond the scope and purpose of
this article. A 401(k) plan is not required to be structured as an ERISA section
404(c) plan. A plan becomes a section 404(c) plan only by complying with the
Department of Labor regulations. SeeJohn L. Utz & Peter 0. Shinevar, ERISA Section 404(c): Limits on Fiduciary Responsibility, 1997 A.B.A. INST. ON ERISA BASICS, Pt.
II.
14. A "defined benefit plan" is a pension plan other than an individual account plan. See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1994). Generally, a defined
benefit plan provides a specific benefit expressed as a monthly amount payable
upon retirement and is frequently based on an employee's years of service with his
employer and a percentage of his compensation. SeeJohn R. Keville, Note, Retire
At Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return On Investment?, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 527, 528-29
(1994).
15. See Keville, supra note 14, at 529.
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contribution plans16 have increased substantially.17 Participant-directed
401(k) plans "have become as common in the American workplace as the
personal computer and the telephone."' s
Since 1975, the number of participants in 401 (k plans has increased
from twelve million to more than twenty-five million. In 1997, the number of 401(k) plans reached 250,000, up from seventeen thousand in
1984. More than one-half of all workers who participate in private pension plans do so through 401 (k plans.2 Total 401 (k) plan assets have
now topped one trillion dollars.
Employers find participant-directed 401 (k) plans appealing because
these plans increase employee involvement in retirement plans, transfer
investment responsibility to employees, and transfer part or all of the cost
of funding the plan to employees. 23 The practical effect of the shift to
participant-directed account plans is that employees are now assuming
more (or most) of the responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of their
24
retirement income
and paying part (or all) of the cost of assuming that
25
responsibility.
The role of 401(k) plans in our society increases dramatically when
one considers the increasing use of such plans in conjunction with the
growing concern regarding Social Security. A lower level of retirement
16. A "defined contribution plan" (or individual account plan) is a pension
plan that provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits
based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account plus any
income, gains, or forfeitures of accounts of other participants allocated to the participant's account, less any expenses or losses. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(34) (1994).
17. See Keville, supra note 14, at 529. Keville argues that the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans has occurred as a result of
changes in the employment landscape, increasing regulation, and differences in
the maintenance costs of the plans. See id. at 529-30.
18. Mary Rudie Barneby, Wat Every Plan Sponsor Should Know About Retirement
PlanFees and Expenses, 415 PLI/TAX, May 1998, at 91, 93.
19. See Tracey Longo, Focusing On 401(k) Fees, FIN.

PLAN., Jan. 1998, at 132,
132; see also Rudie Barneby, supra note 18, at 93 ("More than 30 million Americans
are covered by 401(k) plans and that number seems to grow significantly every
year.").
20. See Longo, supra note 19, at 132.

21. See Comment, DOL Hearing Garners Arguments For And Against Requiring
Additional 401(k) PlanFee Disclosures,Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 26,648 (1998).
22. See Longo, supra note 19, at 132.
23. See Frederick Reish & Bruce L. Ashton, ERISA Section 404(c): ShiftingFiduciary Liability In Participant-DirectedRetirement Plans, Pens. & Ben. Wk. (RIA), Jan.
12, 1998, at 9-10.
24. See Kneip, supra note 12, at 66.
25. See Keville, supra note 14, at 527.
26. See, e.g., Proposals to Preserve and Protect Social Security-PersonalSecurity Accounts: A Means of Strengtheningand Securing Social Security, Before the Senate Comm. on

Fin., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Carolyn L. Weaver, Ph.D., Director, Social
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income from Social Security and further cuts in Medicare benefits
through higher
coinsurance, and eligibility testing
27. deductibles, additional
..
are expected. The real or imagined fear regarding cuts in Social Security will require larger savings and pension benefits. "The best way to
make up the difference is with a qualified retirement plan."2 The retirement plans of this and succeeding generations are participant-directed
401 (k) plans.

30

3

Whether the reason for the one trillion dollars of savings in 401(k)
plans is•. to counter-act
the expected
32
33 lower
.. level of retirement income from
Social Security or other reasons, participants in 401(k) plans are saving
at higher rates than the general population. The cornerstone of 401(k)
plans, however, is not their appeal to employers and employees, it is their
manner of operation. The retirement benefits available to a participant in
a participant-directed account plan upon retirement depends on (1) how
much a participant contributes (plus any contributions made on a participant's behalf by his employer), (2) how well a participant's investments
perform (gains and losses), and (3) how much a participant pays in plan
35
fees and expenses.
B.

Plan Fees and Expenses

A previous concern involving 401(k) plans was that participant retirement accounts were being eroded by employers and plan fiduciaries in
36
prohibited transactions.
Some employers were using plan assets to pay
Security Pension Studies; The American Enterprise Institute, former member,
1994-96; Social Security Advisory Council and U.S. Social Security Advisory Board)
available in 1998 WL 18088310; Kathy Bergen, Personal Savings Stutter While the
Economy Hums, CHI. TRIB.,June 5, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2863616.
27. See Medical Benefit Alternatives, Social Security Cuts Will Require LargerSavings, PensionBenefits, RETIREMENT PLAN TRENDS, May 1998, at 1.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See Keville, supra note 14, at 527.
31. See Longo, supranote 19, at 132.
32. See Medical Benefits Alternatives, supra note 27, at 1.
33. A survey, Americans and Their 401(k)s, found that employees appreciate the
ease of saving through automatic payroll deduction at work and the general population preferred that method of saving for retirement. See Medical Benefits Alternatives, Survey Finds Higher Savings Rates for Participants In Sec. 401(k) Plans,
RETIREMENT PLAN TRENDS, Oct. 1997, at 3.
34. See id.
35. See Keville, supra note 14, at 556 n.15.
36. See Terence P. Pare, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About 401(k)s But
Were Afraid to Ask, FORTUNE, Dec. 25, 1995, at 2. Generally, a "prohibited transaction" is the sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between the plan and a
party in interest; the lending of money or other extension of credit between the
plan and a party in interest; the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between
the plan and a party in interest; the transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a
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37

corporate obligations rather than depositing the monies for investment.
To deter such misuse of plan assets, the Department of Labor (hereinafter
"Department" or "DOL") has increased the requirement for depositing
plan assets for investment.3
A new culprit having the potential to effect a substantial negative impact on the accumulation of retirement accounts of 401(k) plan participants has emerged: 39 plan fees and expenses. 4° The types of fees and expenses that can impact participant-directed account plans include: plan
design and compliance costs (e.g., attorney's fees and Internal Revenue
Service filing fees), investment fees and expenses (which are deducted
from participants' investment assets before the price of the investment
fund is calculated), on-going administrative costs, employee education
and communication fees, and compensation for plan consultants and advisors.

41

These fees and expenses can significantly reduce investment returns4

and "take major bites out of employee savings." 4 '

The methods

party in interest, of any assets of the plan; or the acquisition, on behalf of the plan,
or any employer security or employer real property in violation of other provisions
of ERISA. See ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1994). A "party in interest" is any
fiduciary, including an administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian, counsel, or
employee of an employee benefit plan; a person providing services to a plan; an
employer or employee organization whose employees or members are covered by
a plan; an indirect or direct owner of 50% or more of employer stock. See ERISA §
3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14). ERISA also specifically prohibits a fiduciary from
dealing with plan assets in his own interest or for his own account; involving the
plan on behalf of a party (or representing a party) whose interests are adverse to

the interests of the plan or participants; or receiving any consideration for his own
personal account from any plan; dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction involving plan assets. SeeERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
37.

See Pare, supra note 36, at 2.

38.

See Regulation to Definition of "Plan Assets"-Participant Contributions,

61 FED. REG. 41220, 41220 (1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). The Department changed the time period for deposit of participant salary deferrals to a plan
complying with section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code from 90 days from
the date on which the amounts are received by the employer or would otherwise
be payable to the employee to no later than the 15th business day of the month
following the month in which the amounts are received by the employer or would
otherwise be payable to the employee. See id. The Department treats the salary
deferrals as plan assets in an attempt to address the problem of delays in transmit-

ting participant contributions to plans. See id.
39. See Longo, supra note 19, at 134.
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION,
A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES, Pt. 1 (1998) (visited Sept. 16, 1999)
<http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/pubs/4Olkfe-l.htm>.
41. See Barneby, supranote 18, at 98-102.
42. See Bill Barnhart, 401(k) Fees Can Gnaw On Investor Returns, CHI. TRIB., July
12, 1998, Business section, Zone C: Investing In Mutual Funds, at 3, available in
1998 WL 2875523.
43. Penelope Wang, Protect Yourself Against the Great Retirement Rip-Off. Excessive
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which create these effects include reducing the percentage of the yield
and direct deductions from account balances.4 The problem arises because of the increasing shift of responsibility for gayment of the various
fees and expenses from employers to employees.
The DOL offers the

401(k) Fees Skim an Estimated$1.5 Billion a Year From Workers' Retirement Savings. Here
is How to Protect Your Nest Egg., MONEY MAG., Apr. 1997, Your Retirement, at 96.
44. See Economic Systems, Inc., Final Report: Pension and Welfare Benefits AdministrationStudy of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses, § 3.2 (Apr. 13, 1998) (submitted
to the U.S. Department of Labor) (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.dol.gov/
dol/pwba/public/pubs/40kRept.pdf> (available only on the internet). There
are: (1) asset-based fees which are computed as an annual percentage charge on
the total assets of the plan; (2) census-based fees which are imposed on a per capita participant basis; and (3) itemized fees which specify a fixed charge for a specific service. See id.
45. See id. § 3.6. The following table illustrates the growth in plans (percent
increases) in which plan expenses are paid by the participants only:
1991
16%

1993
17%

1995
18%

1997
24%

4%
5%

3%
10%

4%
10%

4%
14%

Seminar/workshops
Other media

-

-

-

9%
10%

Non-mutual fund investment
management fees
Legal/design fees
Recordkeeping fees
Trustee fees
Other administrative fees

44%
9%
22%
27%
14%

50%
7%
27%
32%
17%

56%
10%
29%
33%
18%

56%
9%
35%
40%
24%

Audit fees
Internal staff
compensation
Employee communication
Investment education:

(Source: Hewitt Associates, 1997- 656 plans reporting in 1991; 486 plans reporting
in 1993; 429 plans reporting in 1995; and 441 plans in 1997.) See id.
The following table, however, illustrates that the employer pays fees and
expenses in a great majority of the plans (except investment management fees)
surveyed:
Participant Employer
Shared
Pays
pays
Expenses
Audit fees
24%
73%
3%
Internal staff compensation
4%
93%
3%
Employee communication
14%
75%
11%
Investment education:
Seminar/workshops
9%
83%
8%
Other media
10%
82%
8%
Non-mutual fund investment
management fees
56%
39%
5%
Legal/design fees
9%
85%
6%
Recordkeeping fees
35%
58%
7%
Trustee fees
40%
55%
5%
Other administrative fees
24%
61%
15%
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following example of the substantial negative impact plan fees and expenses can have on retirement account balances:
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retirement
and a current 401(k) account balance of $25,000. If returns on
investments in your account over the next 35 years average 7
percent and fees and expenses reduce your average returns by
0.5 percent, your account balance will grow to $227,000 at retirement, even if there are no further contributions to your account. If fees and expenses are 1.5 percent, however, your account balance will grow to only $163,000. The 1 percent
difference in fees and expenses would reduce your account balance at retirement by 28 percent.46
ERISA charges plan fiduciaries with the duty to act solely in the in47
terests of plan participants and beneficiaries. The question is whether a
plan fiduciary who fails to fully and affirmatively disclose all plan fees and
expenses-costs that can substantially erode retirement account balances-is acting solely in the interests of plan participants.
This article examines plan fee and expense disclosure under ERISA
section 404(c). Whether an ERISA section 404(c) plan fiduciary has an
affirmative duty to disclose plan fees and expenses depends on the application of general fiduciary principles derived from the common law of
trusts. The basis for holding an ERISA section 404(c) plan fiduciary liable
plan fees
for failure to affirmatively disclose participant-directed account
examined. 48
is
beneficiaries
and
participants
to
expenses
and

(Source: Hewitt Associates, 1997 - 441 plans reporting.) See id.
Investment management fees typically range from 75% to 90% of the total fees and expenses charged to a plan. See id. The author of this article does not
advocate that employee responsibility is undesirable, nor that employers should
shift the responsibility (at least in part) to employees. ERISA provides that employers may shift reasonable expenses to plan participants. See 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c-1 (1998). However, the author of this article notes that employers are
allowed a deduction for plan expenses under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26
U.S.C. § 404 (1994). Moreover, qualified retirement plans traditionally have been
utilized by employers as a means of attracting and retaining employees. See JAY
CONISON, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS IN A NUT SHELL 33-34 (2d ed. West Group,
1998). Since many employers offer 401(k) plans, employer payment of plan fees
and expenses may become a focal point in a potential employee's selection of an
employer.
46. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 40, Pt. 1.
47. SeeERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).

48. Standing to bring suit under ERISA alleging a breach of fiduciary duty for
failure to affirmatively disclose fee and expense information is presumed for purposes of this discussion and is beyond the scope of this article.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
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This article discusses the theories of affirmative fiduciary disclosure
derived from the common law of trusts and applies them to ERISA section
404(c) plan fee and expense information. Although there is currently no
case law that addresses the plan fee and expense disclosure issue, this article proposes that the fiduciary duty of affirmative disclosure under theories derived from the common law of trusts applies.
First, the article sets forth a general overview of persons holding fiduciary status5 0 and provides the general requirements of ERISA section
404(c). 5 1 The article then discusses the theories of affirmative disclosure
52
under the common law of trusts.
Finally, the author ties the common
law theories and principles of trusts to the structure of ERISA section
404(c) and the language of the section 404(c) Department of Labor
Regulations.
II. WHO IS AN ERISA PLAN FIDUCIARY?
A fiduciary is aperson acting in a position of trust with regard to an
employee pension, welfare benefit,56 or benefit plan recognized under
the Act as being subject to the fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities
enumerated under ERISA.57
A person attains fiduciary status by being designated a plan fiduciary
by appointment or in the plan document,58 exercisi
discretionary
authority or control over plan management or plan assets, rendering investment advice regarding plan assets for a fee, - or exercising discretionary authority in plan administration. 6' Fiduciary status may be established
intentionally or inadvertently.62

49. See infra note 54.
50. See infta Part 11.
51. See infra Part III.
52. See infra Part IV.
53. See infra Part V.
54. "Person" means an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation,
mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization,
association, or employee organization. See ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9)
(1994). ERISA section 404(c) specifically excludes participants in section 404(c)
plans from fiduciary status. SeeERISA § 404(c) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (c) (1) (A).
55. See supra note 6.
56. See supra note 6.
57. See Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Who Is "Fiduciary" Within Meaning of §
3(21) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(21)), 67
A.L.R. FED 186, 188 (1994).
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, at FR-3 (1998).
59. See ERISA§ 3(21) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1994).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. SeeJay B. Rosen, Show Me the Money! (Otherwise Known as ERISA, Brokers and
Wrap Fee Accounts), 999 PLI/CoRP, July 1997, at 263, 268.
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Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary only to the extent he performs
63
Consequently, courts have
one of the defined fiduciary responsibilities.
held that a person who performs limited fiduciary duties is not a fiduciary
for all purposes. 64 A functional test is utilized to determine whether a person or entity has or65 exercises any of the functions described in section
In applying this test, courts examine the person's
3(21) (A) of ERISA.
fiduciary status.66
actions and duties, not title or position, to determine
A person's position is examined to determine whether the person
67
This analysis applies to
engages in activities that carry fiduciary status.
members of the board of directors of an employer8 as well as to attorneys,
accountants, actuaries or consultants who render services to an employee
benefit plan. 69 Certain positions, however, such as plan trustee or plan
70
administrator, automatically carry fiduciary status.

63. See id. at 269.
64. See, e.g., Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.
1985) (concluding that employer that was a fiduciary because it appointed plan
administrator is not itself a fiduciary with respect to plan administration).
65. See Robert N. Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 415 PLI/TAx, May
1998, at 9, 14; see also Michael J. Dell, ERISA Litigation Issues, 560 PLI/Lrr., Mar.
1997, at 67, 76 (stating that the courts have developed a flexible test to determine
who is a fiduciary).
66. See, e.g., Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a person's "actions, not the official designation of his role, determine
whether he enjoys fiduciary status").
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at D-3 (1998). For example, the designation
"benefit supervisor" may mean a plan employee whose sole function is to calculate
the amount of benefits to which each plan participant is entitled and report the
amount to the plan administrator who would authorize the payment of benefits to
a particular plan participant. See id. In this situation, the benefit supervisor does
not perform any of the functions described in section 3(21) (A) and is therefore
not a plan fiduciary. See id. The designation of "benefit supervisor" also may mean
a plan employee who has the final authority to authorize or disallow benefit payments. See id. Under this scenario, the benefit supervisor would be a fiduciary
within the meaning of section 3(21) (A). See id.
68. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, at D-4 (1998). Section 2509.75-8 provides:
A "person" may be a corporation under the definition of person contained in section 3(9) of the Act. While such designation satisfies the requirement of enabling employees or other interested persons to ascertain the person or persons responsible for operating the plan, a plan
instrument which designates a corporation as "named fiduciary" should
provide for designation by the corporation of specified individuals or
other persons to carry out specified fiduciary responsibilities under the
plan ....
Id. § 2509.75-5, at FR-3.
69. See id. § 2509.75-5, at D-1.
70. The plan administrator may be the employer that sponsors the plan. See
Jody L. Mikasen et al., What Is A Fiduciary, 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement
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Individuals found to be plan fiduciaries have included a plan's insurplan. 72
ance broker and a purchaser of a company sponsoring a qualified
A corporate employer has also been held to be a plan fiduciary where it
exercised the authority contemplated by section 3(21) (A) of the Act.7S
III. ERISA SECTION 404(c)
A.

Background

An ERISA fiduciary has the duty to make prudent investment decithe plan. 75
sions. 7 4 One aspect of that duty is to preserve the assets of
ERISA section 409 generally holds a fiduciary personally liable for breach
of a fiduciary duty. However, section 404(c) of the Act releases a fiduciary from liability for loss resulting from a participant's exercise of control
over the assets
77 in the participant's account if the plan meets certain requirements.
Generally, the plan must provide for individual participant
78
accounts and 9permit participants to direct the investment of assets in
their accounts.
Section 404(c) was enacted in 1974 as part of the original regulatory
scheme that became ERISA.80 The DOL has adopted regulations that set
forth the requirements of section 404(c) in detail, including fiduciary
conduct, fiduciary obligations, and disclosure of plan financial information with which a plan must comply in order to be deemed a section

Funds § 569 (1988).
71. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, atD-3 (1998).
72. See Kobylak, supra note 57, at 191.
73. See id. at 192.
74. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (1994); see also 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1998) (describing the investment duties of a fiduciary).
75. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,

Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985) ("One of the fundamental common-law duties of a
trustee is to preserve and maintain trust assets ...
76. See ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
77. See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. 111996).
78. See supra note 16. Individual participant accounts are found in an individual account plan or defined contribution plan defined under ERISA section
3(34). See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994). For a detailed discussion,
see generally, Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Is "IndividualAccount Plan" or "Defined ContributionPlan" Under 29 USCS § 1002(34) Which Defines Such Terms for Purposes of Labor Law Provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 51
A.L.R. FED 552 (1981) (analyzing the federal court cases which have discussed

what is an "individual account plan" or a "defined contribution plan" under
ERISA).
79. See ERISA § 404(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1996); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1998) (describing the kinds of plans that are section
404(c) plans).
80. See supranotes 3-6 and accompanying text.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/11
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404(c) plan. s' The final regulations offering guidance on how to limit fiduciary liability under section 4 04(c) were issued by the Department in
October of 1992, almost8 2ten years after section 404(c) plans became private retirement vehicles.
B.

ERISA Section 404(c) and the Department of Labor Regulations

A fiduciary of an ERISA section 404(c) plan is relieved of liability for
a participant's or beneficiary's investment decision only if the participant
or beneficiary has exercised independent control over the investment of
his account. To be deemed to exercise independent control, a plan participant or beneficiary must have an opportunity to choose from a broad
range of investments and must
have sufficient information to make an in4
formed investment decision.8
1.

A Broad Range of Investment Alternatives

Paragraph (b) (2) of the regulations provides that a participant or
beneficiary is afforded an opportunity to exercise control over the assets
in her account only if the plan provides
participants
the opportunity to
•
815
choose from a broad range of investments. A plan satisfies this requirement if it provides participants the opportunity to invest in at least three
86
different investment alternatives.
Many 401(k) plans, however, offer
more than the three minimum investment options.
"[T]he average
number of investment options offered to employees has doubled during
the past decade, from less than four (3.5) in 1990 to more than eight (8.2)
in 19 9 7 .- '
Each of the three minimum investment options must have materially
different risk and return characteristics and contain diversified assets that
will enable participants to: (1) affect materially their investment returns
and degree of investment risk; (2) construct an investment portfolio with
aggregate risk and reward characteristics that are normally appropriate to
their individual needs; and (3) reduce investment risk through diversification.89 Practitioners in the private retirement plan arena have concluded

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1998).
See id.
See id.
See id. § 2550.404c-1 (b).
See id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2).
See id. § 2550.404c-1.
See Medical Benefit Alternatives, 401(k) Plans Are Offering More Investment
Options to Participants,RETIREMENT PLAN TRENDS, Mar. 1998, at 3.
88. Id.
89. See Kneip, supra note 12, at 49; see also Thomas R. Hoecker & Nancy K.
Campbell, ParticipantDirected Investment Plans-Problemsand Solutions, Q245 ALI-
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that a participant-directed investment plan must offer at minimum, a
stock fund, a bond fund, and a money market (or similar) fund to meet
the "broad range of investment" requirement.90

2.

Sufficient Information to Make Informed Investment Decisions

Paragraph (b) (2) of the regulations also provides that a participant
or beneficiary is afforded an opportunity to exercise control over the assets in his account only if he is provided or has the opportunity to obtain
sufficient information to make informed decisions regarding investment
alternatives available under the plan. 91 The regulations mandate that plan
fiduciaries provide certain plan information to all participants and select
plan information either directly or upon request.

a. Affirmative Statutory Disclosure

94

A plan fiduciary must provide, in relevant part,

participants with:

ABA, June 6, 1996, at 211, 218.
90. See Hoecker & Campbell, supra note 89, at 218-19. The regulations allow
plans to offer "look through investment vehicles" as a means of fulfilling the diversification requirement of section 404(c). See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b) (1998). A
"look-through investment vehicle" is defined in the regulations to include a mutual fund, collective trust fund, pooled separate account, guaranteed investment
contract ("GIC"), or bank investment contract ("BIC"). See id. § 2550.404c-1 (e).
91. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (1998).
92. See supra Part III.B.2.a and accompanying notes.
93. See supra Part III.B.2.b and accompanying notes.
94. An ERISA section 404(c) plan fiduciary is also required to affirmatively
disclose the following information to plan participants in order for the plan to
meet the requirements of section 404(c):
" An explanation that the plan is intended to constitute an ERISA section
404(c) plan, and that the plan fiduciaries may be relieved of liability for any
losses which are the direct and necessary result of investment instructions
given by the participant or beneficiary.
See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (z);

* Identification of any designated investment managers. See id. § 2550.404c1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (iii);
* An explanation of how investment instructions are to be provided by participants, including any specified limitation on investment instructions. See
id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (iv);
" Name, address and telephone number of the plan fiduciary(ies) responsible
for providing to plan participants the mandatory disclosure items and the
items required to be disclosed upon request, and a description of the information available upon request. See id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (w);
" For plans that offer employer securities as an investment alternative, a description of the plan procedures established to provide for the confidentiality of information relating to participants' interests in employer securities,
and the exercise of voting, tender and similar rights. See id. § 2550.404cI (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (viz);
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(1) a description of each investment alternative available under the plan
and a general description of the investment objectives and risk and return
characteristics of each investment alternative, including the type and diversification
of assets comprising the portfolio of each investment alterna95
tive; (2) a description of any transaction fees and expenses imposed
upon the participant's account balance in connection with the purchase
96
or sale of interests in each investment alternative; and (3) immediately
following a participant's initial investment in an investment alternative
subject to the Securities Act of 1933, a copy of the most recent prospectus
97
provided to the plan.
This requirement is deemed satisfied if the prospectus is provided immediately Prior to the participant's initial investment in an investment alternative.

b.

Disclosure Upon Request

In addition to the items set forth above, upon the request of a participant, a plan fiduciary must provide: 1°° (1) a description of the annual

Subsequent to an investment, any materials provided to the plan relating to
the exercise of voting, tender or similar rights incidental to a participant's
ownership interest in the investment and passed through to participants,
and a description of or reference to plan provisions relating to the exercise
of those rights. See id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (ix).
95. See id. § 2550.404c-1(b) (2) (i) (B)(1) (ii).
96. See id. § 2550.404c-l(b) (2) (i)(B) (1) (v).
97. See id. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (viii).
98. See id.
99. The regulations provide that this information is to be provided to a plan
participant "either directly or upon request." Id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (2).
Available commentary regarding the regulations generally fail to note that a plan
fiduciary may consistently and affirmatively provide this information to all plan
participants and beneficiaries. See, e.g., Kneip, supra note 12, at 63 (stating only
that " [u] pon the request of a participant, an identified plan fiduciary (or its designees) must provide" such information); Hoecker & Campbell, supra note 89, at
221 (stating only "[i]nformation which is required to be provided on request to
participants includes"); Reish & Ashton, supra note 23, at 13 ("Participants must be
provided certain information on request."). But see Utz & Shinevar, supranote 13,
Pt. II ("The participant or beneficiary must be provided by an identified plan fiduciary (or that fiduciary's designee), either directly or upon request."). Fiduciary
disclosure is likely limited to "upon request" only. But one company breaks the
mold. See, e.g., Fred Williams, Company Frank About Plan Fees: Black & Decker Tells
All to Workers, PENS. & INVESTMENTS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 2 (discussing that Black &
Decker's $300 million plan is a model because it has incorporated affirmative fee
disclosure into its investment education and participant communication materials
by itemizing fees on quarterly participant statements and explaining fees and guiding participants through the entire cost issue in a colorful brochure).
100. An ERISA section 404(c) plan fiduciary must also provide plan participants, either directly or upon request, the following information in order for the
plan to meet the requirements of section 404(c) and for the fiduciary to claim the
relief afforded by that section:
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101

operating expenses of each designated investment alternative which reduce the rate of return to participants, and the aggregate amount of the
expenses exgressed as a percentage of average net assets of the investment
alternative, and (2) prospectuses, financial statements and reports, and
any other available materials relating to the investment alternative to the
10
extent such information is provided to the plan.
IV. Is AN ERISA PLAN FIDUCIARY'S FAILURE TO AFFIRMATiVELY
DISCLOSE 401 (K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY UNDER ERISA?
Fiduciary duties and standards of conduct are set forth generally in
section 404 of ERISA.10 In its most basic terms, section 404 directs ERISA
plan fiduciaries "to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" 105 and "for the exclusive purpose of: (1) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.""106 Commonly
referred to as the exclu107
sive purpose or exclusive benefit rule, this ERISA fiduciary standard is
derived from the common law duty of loyalty' °s and is one of the "highest
[standards] known to the law.
"The duty of loyalty owed by ERISA fiduciaries is broad.., and includes a duty to disclose material informa-

* Information concerning the value of shares or units held in the requesting
participant's accounts. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (2)(v);
" Information concerning the value of an interest or units in an investment alternative, including the past and current investment performance, net of
expenses. See id. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (2) (iv);
* A list of the assets which constitute plan assets and the value of each such asset. See id. § 2550.404c-1(b) (2) (i) (B) (2) (iii);

" For guaranteed fixed rate investment contracts, the name of the issuer of
the contract and its terms and rate of return. See id.
101. See id. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (i) (B) (2) (z). Examples of annual operating
expenses include investment management fees, administrative fees, and transaction costs. See id.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
See id. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (i) (B) (2) (it).
See ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).

105. ERISA§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
106. Id. Section 403(c) (1) of ERISA also requires that the assets of a plan be
held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable administrative expenses. See ERISA § 403(c) (1), 29
U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1).
107. See Daniel Fischel &John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1998).
108. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985).

109.

Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

1069 (1982).
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tion ."ll°
Courts have traditionally imposed liability on a plan fiduciary under
the auspices of the exclusive purpose rule to actions taken by a fiduciary
to benefit his own personal interest (whether or not the fiduciary actually
benefits) i n and to actions taken in favor of the interests of a third 2 party
implicated.1
even if a fiduciary's own personal interest is not directly
Under ERISA federal common law,' 3 ERISA fiduciary disclosure obdeveloped
alle11dduie
ligations115are a category
. of actual orAct.
ha hv
the
of
404
section
recently under

A.

Affirmative Duty to Disclose Truthful Information-The Common Law
Duty of Undivided Loyalty

Several courts have applied the exclusive purpose rule to fiduciary
communications and found misleading fiduciary communications to provide the basis for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA and the
110. International Bhd. of Painters v. Duval, 925 F. Supp. 815, 821 (D.D.C.
1996) (citations omitted).
111. See, e.g., Wright v. Nimmons, 641 F. Supp. 1391, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(recognizing breach of fiduciary duty where fiduciary "consistently treat[ed] the
trust assets as if they were his own property"); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp.
390, 409-10 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (finding breach of fiduciary duty where fiduciaries
illegally made themselves and plan attorney eligible for plan benefits); Teamsters
Local No. 145 v. Kuba, 631 F. Supp. 1063, 1072 (D. Conn. 1986) (finding fiduciary
breach of duty of loyalty where trustees supported plan amendment permitting
them to keep trustee positions even if they lost their union offices).
112. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938, 945-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding breach of fiduciary duty where fiduciary utilized employee contributions for corporate purposes); Marshall v. Cuevas, 1 Employee
Benefit Cas. (BNA) 1580, 1580-81 (D.P.R. 1979) (finding breach of fiduciary duty
where fiduciary allowed needless payment to widow by plan).
113. Courts are charged with developing ERISA federal common law from the
common law of trusts taking into account "the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans." Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1013 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Cal.
1996) (observing that federal courts have an obligation to develop federal common law rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans); Donovan, 550 F.
Supp. at 403 (stating that the provisions of ERISA are to be interpreted both in the
light of the common law of trusts and the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans to protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries);
Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis. 1979) ("[T]he
intent of Congress was to federalize the common law of trusts.").
114. See Ethan Lipsig et al., Fiduciary Disclosure Obligation, in ERISA FIDUCIARY
LAw 1998 SUPPLEMENT 153, 153 (Susan P. Serota ed. 1995).
115. See id.
116. This is to be distinguished from ERISA fiduciary disclosure obligations
under section 104 of the Act. Under section 104, a plan fiduciary must comply
with filing and disclosure requirements in addition to any affirmative disclosure
obligations that arise from the general fiduciary principles inherent within section
404(a). SeeERISA§ 104, 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (1994).
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common law duty of undivided loyalty. For example, the exclusive purpose rule was found to be a basis for a claim of fiduciary breach in the following cases: Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 117 Local Union 2134, UMW v. Powhaten Fuel, Inc., "8 Muenchow
v. ParkerPen Co.," 9 and Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. 120 The courts
recognized the following as misleading: (1) representations to plan trustees that interest credits and expense charges assessed to a defined benefit
plan were lower than the actual interest credits earned and expenses
charged; 121 (2) representations to employees that they were insured under
a health plan sponsored by their employer when health insurance coverage did not exist; l 22 (3) communications to employees that a certain number ofjobs would be available after plant modernization to employees who
terminated their seniority rights and accepted severance benefits subject
to ERISA when the number ofjobs available was significantly less than that
communicated; 12 and (4) representations to employees that the company
would not provide a second offering of severance plan benefits when the
company later made a second offering of severance pay benefits.' 24
Further, the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Varity Corp. v. Howe12 applied the exclusive
125 benefit rule to employer communications regarding nonfiduciary matters.
The Court found that the
duty not to make affirmative material misrepresentations arose in the context of employer
communications
that were intentionally linked to bene•
127
fits subject to ERISA.
The Court confirmed that section 404 of the Act

117. 698 F.2d 320, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that it is a breach of
fiduciary duty to misrepresent deposit fund summaries and to fail to disclose internal account summaries).
118. 828 F.2d 710, 713 (11th Cir. 1987) (observing that misrepresentations to
employees as to the existence of insurance coverage is a breach of fiduciary duty).
119. 615 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (recognizing a breach of fiduciary duty where the employer misrepresented maximum employment levels to
induce employees to accept severance benefits in exchange for termination of
their seniority rights).
120. 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that liability will lie only if
material misrepresentations in violation of ERISA section 404 are proven).

121.

See Peoria Union Stock Yards, 698 F.2d at 326.

122. See Powhaten Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d at 713.
123. See Muenchow, 615 F. Supp. at 1417.
124. See Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1163-64.
125. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).

126. See id. at 498-503.
127. See id. at 498. Varity Corporation, acting in its corporate (rather than fiduciary) capacity, decided to spin off several of its divisions that were losing money
and create a new, separately incorporated subsidiary. See id. at 493. The spin-off,
in part, was to relieve Varity of its benefit obligations with respect to employees
who transferred to the newly created subsidiary. See id. The new subsidiary was to
have its own benefit programs. See id. To induce employees to transfer, Varity
held a meeting to reassure employees that their benefits would remain secure fol-
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incorporates the common law duty of loyalty and that lying is inconsistent
with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries. 118
Since Varity Corp., the fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information
has been considered in a variety of situations includin~employer reprehealth maintesentations regarding the security of plan investments,
nance organization
disclosures regarding physician compensation ar130
rangements,
and a plan trustee's failure to disclose a familial
relationship with a financial consultant hired to manage the pension
plan's assets.13
1.

Substantive Requirementsfor Claim of Breach ofFiduciaryDuty
to Disclose Truthful Information
a. Misrepresentationsor Misleading Communications

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Peoobserved that "there is little doubt that... misrepresentations and

S132

3a,

•

.

.

.133

-

omissions [are] breaches of... fiduciary obligations" and "[]ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in
section 404(a) (1) of ERISA."
Peoria arose out135of Penn Mutual's promotion of a group deposit administration annuity to the trustees of the company's defined benefit
lowing their transfer. See id. at 493-94. Based on these representations, about
1,500 employees transferred to the new subsidiary. See id. at 494. The new subsidiary went into receivership in its second year of operations and employees lost
their benefit coverage. See id.
128. See id.at 506 (quoting Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983)).
129. See, e.g., In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., No. 91-3067, 1997 WL 732473, at *25
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1997) (finding that participant-plaintiffs had all the information
they needed to make informed choices about their investments and that Unisys

had no obligation to disclose to the participants that which the participants already knew).
130. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir.) (finding a duty to disclose), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
131. See International Bhd. of Painters v. Duval, 925 F. Supp. 815, 822 (D.D.C.
1996) (determining that exploiting and concealing such a relationship is inconsistent with a fiduciary's duty of loyalty).
132. 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 326.
134. Id. at 326. However, the Peoria court remanded the case for determination whether Penn Mutual was an ERISA fiduciary. See id. at 328.
135. See id. at 322. A group deposit administration annuity is a type of contract
in which an insurance company determines an employer's annual contribution to
its retirement plan in order to fund the plan, and the contributions are deposited
with the insurance company for investment. See id. The insurance company invests the employer contributions as a single account (rather than setting up a
separate account for each employee) and the funds in the account are commin-
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plan. i s6 The misrepresentations made by Penn Mutual involved the
amount of investment income that would be credited to the plan rather
than retained by Penn Mutual.

s7

Penn Mutual failed to disclose the ac-

tual interest credits earned and expenses charged to the plan because the
contract was of a type "in which [the] contractholder does not see actual
expenses. " ls8
b.

Materiality

Adopting the supporting rationale of Peoria and the early misrepresentation cases,
the Sixth Circuit, in Berlin,14° extended the fiduciary
duty to disclose to include negligent misrepresentations made by plan fiduciaries to plan participants.
"Put simply, when a plan administrator
speaks, it must speak truthfully. " ' However, the court imposed a materiality requirement before a finding of liability will be imposed on a fiduciary for misrepresentations or omissions in violation of ERISA section
404.143 A misrepresentation or omission by an ERISA fiduciary is deemed
material if there is a substantial likelihood that the communication would
mislead a reasonable participant in making an adequately informed decision.144
2.

Application to PlanFees and Expenses
a.

Misrepresentationsor MisleadingCommunications

A fiduciary of a participant-directed account plan must provide participants and beneficiaries with information regarding each investment

gled with the funds of other customers of the insurance company. See id.
136. See id.

137. See id. at 323. Penn Mutual made representations that employer contributions would earn a certain interest and that the group annuity contract would incur only modest expenses. See id. at 322. The plan trustees later discovered that
interest credits and expense charges assessed to the plan were higher than those
represented by Penn Mutual. See id. at 323.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Local Union 2134, United Mine Workers of America v. Powhatan
Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 713 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty if

an employer misrepresents the existence of coverage to employees); Muenchow v.
Parker Pen Co., 615 F. Supp. 1405, 1417 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (finding employer's

misrepresentation regarding severance pay plan to union-member employees a
breach of fiduciary duty).
140. 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).

141.

See id. at 1163-64.

142.
143.
144.

Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).
See Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1164 n.7.
See Fischer,994 F.2d at 135.
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alternative offered under the plan 145 in order to limit its liability under
ERISA section 404(c).146 In complying with the section 404(c) disclosure
requirements, a fiducia 7 is arguably engaging in a fiduciary communication or representation.
Similar to the group annuity contract at issue in Peoria, participantwhich fees
directed account plan assets are frequently invested in funds in 148
For exand actual rates of return are not disclosed to plan participants.
fees.1 49
ample, participant-directed account plans are subject to investment
Investment fees are "[b]y far the largest component of 401(k) plan fees
against participant acand expenses." ° Investment fees are assessed
151
deducted from an incounts in the form of an indirect charge 5-i.e.,
vestment's actual rate of return. Fees assessed in this manner "are not
specifically identified on [participant] statements of investments, [and]
may not be immediately apparent." 1 2 Consequently, only net (after-cost)
rates of return are reported to plan participants and beneficiaries.
Disclosure of net rates of return misrepresent actual fund performance. The representation omits fees and expenses assessed against participant accounts. Such disclosures and omissions occur, albeit negligently, 53 within the auspices of fiduciary compliance with ERISA section
404(c). The plan fiduciary speaks but fails to speak truthfully.154

145. See supraPart III.B and accompanying notes.
146. See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. 111996); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (1998).
147. See Barneby, supra note 18, at 93-94.
148. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 40, Pt. 2.
149. See id. Pt. 2, at 4.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. Pt. 2, at 5.

153.

One of the concerns advanced in the debate over disclosure of 401(k)

plan fees and expenses is that plan fiduciaries themselves are unaware of the fees

and expenses actually assessed against participant accounts because of the numerous pricing models and lack of disclosure by players in the investment industry.
See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, §§ 5.2, 5.3.3. However, a plan fiduciary's ignorance of fees and expenses charged to the plan (regardless of who pays
the fees) is arguably a breach of fiduciary duty to act for the exclusive purpose of
defraying the reasonable expenses of the plan and solely in the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries. See ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
This is also likely to be a breach of the duty of prudence in selecting investments.
See id.

154.

See Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (re-

quiring that "when a plan [fiduciary] speaks, it must speak truthfully").
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Materiality

Materiality is determined by the effect the statement has upon its listeners.15 Implicit in the determination of materiality is the idea that
ERISA plan fiduciaries need not pass along to participants information of
aware.156
which participants are already
In his book, Bogle on Mutual Funds: New Perspectives for the Intelligent
Mr.
Investor,157John Bogle sets forth the concept of the eternal triangle.
Bogle observes:
[R] isk, return, and cost are the three sides of the eternal triangle of investing.... [T]he cost penalty may sharply erode the
risk premium to which an investor is entitled .... [I]nvesting in
a fund.., bears careful examination. Unless... the higher
costs... are justified by higher expected returns or enhanced
value of service, select your investments from among the lowercost.., funds. 9
Arguably, participants in participant-directed account plans make investment decisions based on investment information disclosed by the plan
fiduciary pursuant to ERISA section 404(c).' 6 Investment information
disclosed by section 404(c) fiduciaries, while arguendo in compliance with
section 404(c), provides plan participants with after-cost investment risk
and yield information only, without the cost penalties--cost penalties plan
participants are paying.
The information disclosed neither explains nor
otherwise informs plan participants about the various fees and expenses
assessed against their accounts, nor does it provide plan participants with
a means for determining the fees and expenses or the relative impact of
such fees and expenses. Consequently, the effect is that plan participants
believe that there are no fees and expenses or that they (plan participants) do not bear the burden of any fees and expenses.
Thus, reason155. See Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1164 n.7 (6th Cir.
1988).
156. See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., No. 91-3067, 1997 WL 732473, at *27 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 24, 1997).
157. JOHN C. BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS: NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR THE
INTELLIGENT INVESTOR (1994).
158. See id. at 303.
159. Id. at 303-04.
160. But see Unisys, 1997 WL 732473, at *27. Plan participants admitted that
they did not read the materials Unisys provided to inform themselves when making their investment decisions and they would not transfer their money to other
investments regardless of what Unisys said. See id. at *28.
161. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 40, Pt. 2.
162. Arguably, the Department of Labor agrees to a degree by releasing its
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able participants are being mislead in making retirement investment decisions.
Plannatin"
participants
(1) should"163be able to engage in the "careful examiavancd
byJohnnation" advanced by John Bogle,
and select investments from among
lower-cost funds unless the higher expected returns or enhanced value of
service warrant otherwise,' 6 4 or (2) should be enabled to affect materially
their investment returns and degree of investment risk; construct an investment portfolio with aggregate risk and reward characteristics that are
normally appropriate to their
16 individual needs; and reduce investment
risk through diversification.
Plan participants require information regarding all fees and expenses assessed against their accounts and the impact such fees and expenses have on their accounts. According to the
available literature, there generally is not affirmative disclosure of necessary plan fee and expense information. 66
Section (b) (2) of the regulations requires a plan fiduciary to provide
upon request: (1) a description of the annual operating expenses which
reduce the rate of return, including investment fees, administrative fees,
and transaction costs; (2) the aggregate amount of expenses expressed as
a percentage of average net assets of investment alternatives; and (3) prospectus, financial statements and reports, and any other available materials relating to an investment
alternative to the extent such information is
. 167
provided to the plan.
However, it can be contended that a participant
lacks the knowledge to request fee and expense information when fiduciary communications (by omission) mislead a participant about the fee and
expense aspect of his account. Affirmative disclosure of after-cost (net) rates
of return preclude participant acquisition of the knowledge necessary to
make an adequately informed (or any) request for detailed fee and expense information. " [T ] he same ignorance that precipitates
for
•
,
. the need
168
answers often limits the ability to ask precisely the right questions."

educational brochure in order to notify plan participants about fees and expenses
and encourage them to ask their plan fiduciaries about the fees assessed against
their plans. See id.
163. See BOGLE, supranote 157, at 302-06.
164.
165.

See id. at 304.
See Kneip, supra note 12, at 49.

166.

See, e.g., Longo, supra note 19, at 132-33 (discussing reasons why fees are

not being disclosed); Wang, supra note 43, at 96 (stating that most plans do not

regularly disclose the costs even when the fees seriously erode investor returns).
But see Williams, Company Frank About Plan Fees: Black & Decker Tells All To Workers,
Pens. & Investments, Dec. 22, 1997, at 2, 42 (discussing that Black & Decker's $300
million plan is a model because it has incorporated affirmative fee disclosure into
its investment education and participant communication materials by itemizing
fees on quarterly participant statements and explaining fees and guiding participants through the entire cost issue in a colorful brochure).
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(i)(2)(B)(2) (1998).

168.

Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Alternatively, the fee and expense information that must be disseminated upon request does not communicate the impact of fees necessary
for individual participants to make adequately informed decisions appropriate to their individual needs. 16 In its study on plan fees and expenses,
the Department found that eighty-five percent of participants that responded to a survey • regarding optional ° features in .170
their plans prefer
greater investment returns over more services from their plans.
Because
171
only net rates of return are being disclosed to participants
(thereby
omitting the fees assessed for the various features and services offered),
participants are precluded from making adequately informed decisions
regarding greater investment returns as opposed to optional features or
services that can increase the fees attributed to a particular investment
fund.
In sum, current section 404(c) plan fee and expense disclosure prac172
tices
are likely a breach of the affirmative duty to disclose truthful information to plan participants and beneficiaries under the common law
duty of undivided loyalty. Arguably, most current disclosure practices involve misrepresentations or misleading communications regarding plan
fees and expenses that are material to participant investment decisionmaking.

B.

Affirmative Duty to Disclose When the PlanFiduciaryKnows that
Silence Might be Harmful

Several circuit courts have held that ERISA may impose17s
an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose under certain circumstances.
One cir169. See Kneip, supra note 12, at 49. Kneip notes that the investment options
offered under a participant-directed plan must be such that participants can construct an investment portfolio appropriate to their individual needs. See id. John
Bogle recommends selecting investments from among lower-cost funds unless
higher-cost funds are justified by higher expected rates of return or enhanced
value of service. See BOGLE, supra note 157, at 303-04. Plan participants are not
equipped with the ability to adequately select the funds that meet their individual
preferences for investment growth, specialty services, or economy with regard to
the fees and expenses they are willing to pay. See Eddy, 919 F.2d at 751.
170. See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, § 3.7.
171. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 40, Pt. 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 148-152.
172. That is, net (after-cost) rates of return on statements of investment. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 40, Pt. 2.
173. See, e.g., Eddy, 919 F.2d 747, 751-52 (holding that a fiduciary has a duty,
upon inquiry, to convey to a lay beneficiary correct and complete material information); Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1301 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a fiduciary has an affirmative disclosure obligation if the fiduciary is on notice that the failure to disclose would harm the participant or beneficiary); Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity
Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that a
financial consultant's former firm, if found on remand to be an ERISA fiduciary,
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cumstance is when a plan fiduciary knows that silence about plan or bene174
In Bixler
fit information may be harmful to a participant or beneficiary.
75
v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund,' a plan beneficiary requested information regardinga death benefit but failed to inquire
The court observed that a fiduciary
about continued medical coverage.
has an affirmative disclosure obligation if the fiduciary is on notice that
or beneficiary. 177
the failure to disclose would harm a participant1779
17
in
Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. appears to be the first case
which a court recognized that plan fiduciaries may have an affirmative
duty to disclose pertinent plan or benefit information even when the inforPlan or benefit
mation was not specifically requested by a plan participant.
information that may need to be disclosed includes new or relevant inthat
formation about beneficiary status and options or circumstances
181
The court
threaten interests relevant to the beneficiary relationship.
noted that a fiduciary has a duty not only to inform a beneficiary, but also
to advise him. 82 This duty evolved from the common law of trusts "long
before the enactment of ERISA."' s3
had a duty to disclose that the consultant had terminated employment due to integrity issues because the consultant's clients "needed to know [this information]
for [their] protection");Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1013 (3d
Cir. 1997) (finding that a written disclosure to a participant regarding his disability
retirement options could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty if it did not notify
the participant of the irrevocability ofjoint and survivor annuity elections). But see
Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 302
(1996) (rejecting the notion that a fiduciary is required to make voluntary disclosures regarding changes to a benefit program absent participant inquiry). Cf
Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that, absent inquiry or the creation of confusion by the fiduciary, no affirmative obligation exists to disclose an HMO's physician compensation structure).
174. See Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300.
175. 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993).
176. See id. at 1301-02.
177. See id. at 1300. Here, the alleged fiduciary was on notice by the beneficiary's request for information. See id. at 1301.
178. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Eddy involved representations made by Colonial Life, as plan fiduciary, to Eddy, a plan participant who had AIDS, regarding
Eddy's ability to continue health coverage upon termination of his employerprovided group health plan. See id. at 749. Eddy failed to ask about his "conversion rights"-the right to convert the policy from employment-based coverage to
an individual policy. See id. Colonial Life did not mention to Eddy that he could
convert his employer-provided insurance to an individual policy and remain insured although Colonial Life truthfully told Eddy that he was not eligible for continuation coverage (which is available only where an individual's coverage terminated but the group policy continued). See id.
179. SeeLipsigetal., supra note 114, at 166.
180. See Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 750-51.
183. Id. Comment d to section 173 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts pro-
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The common law duty to furnish information to a beneficiary when a
beneficiary needs to know the information for its protection has also been
established as a fundamental fiduciary duty by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridge Securities, Inc.184 In Glaziers & Glassworkers, various benefit funds of

the Union Local No. 252 brought an action against the securities brokerage firm managing the funds' assets for failure to disclose information
the
185
firm knew regarding fraudulent activity of one of its employees.
Relying
on its earlier decision in Bixler, the court found that ERISA's duty to inform encompasses not only a negative duty to avoid misinforming, but
also an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence
might be harmful.18 6 Bixler recognized the disparity of training and
fiduciary.187
knowledge that exists between a lay beneficiary and a trained
A fiduciary has a duty to convey complete and accurate material information based upon its advanced knowledge.188
The Third Circuit affirmed this perspective in Jordan v. FederalExpress
Cop189
Corp., concluding that a "specific request for information [by a participant] is not necessarily a prerequisite for finding a fiduciary breach to inform."' 90 Rather, a fiduciary's knowledge can invoke a fiduciary's affirmative obligation to disclose 9 ' since "the duty.. .to192 disclose material
The information
information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility."
at issue in Jordan involved disclosure of an irrevocability aspect of a re-

vides:
Ordinarily the trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary to furnish information to him in the absence of a request for such information ....
In dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, however, he
is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary all material facts in
connection with the transaction which the trustee knows or should
know ....
Even if the trustee is not dealing with the beneficiary on the
trustee's own account, he is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he
knows the beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to
know for his protection in dealing with a third person ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173, cmt. d (1959).

184. 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996).
185. See id. at 1175-76
186. See id. at 1180.
187. See Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300 (3d Cir. 1993).
188. See id. at 1302-03
189. 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997).
190. Id. at 1016.
191. See Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d at 1181 (citing Bix/er, 12 F.3d at 1300).
192. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d
747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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193

The court
tirement benefit election and joint annuitant designation.
determined that the fiduciary's failure to affirmatively notify the participant of an arguably material fact could be a fiduciary breach even if the
disclosure does not violate ERISA's specific disclosure provisions or a term
According to the court, the relevant inquiry for determinof the plan.1
ing such a breach is whether the administrator failed to inform the participant of a material aspect of his benefits. 95
Similarly, in Shea v. Esensten, 96 the Eighth Circuit found that a health
maintenance organization acting as an ERISA fiduciary has an affirmative
duty to disclose a physician compensation arrangement that offers finan-

Citing Bixler, the
cial incentives that discourage referrals to specialists.
court affirmed that an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to speak out if it knows
that silence might be harmful 19 especially when the danger to the plan
participant's well being was created by the fiduciary itself.'9 9 This duty
turns on the fiduciary's knowledge of any material facts that could adThe financial incentive at issue
versely affect a plan member's interests.
of
information from the participiece
be
a
material
in Shea was held to
2°
'
of
view.
pant's point
In sum, the elements of the common law of trust's affirmative duty to
armight
silence
disclose when the fiduciary knows that
•
.
.202P be harmful to
(2)
or
knowledge;
notice
(1)
fiduciary
ticipants or beneficiaries include:
potential for or existence of harm; 2 (3) the information is a material aspect of benefits under the plan; 204 and (4) the information is material

193. See Jordan,116 F.3d at 1007.
194. See id. at 1014.
195. See id. at 1015.
196. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
197. See id. at 628-29.
198. See id. at 629 (citing Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a fiduciary has an affirmative disclosure obligation if the fiduciary is on notice that the failure to disclose
would harm the participant or beneficiary)).
199. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 629.
200. See id. at 628. The Eighth Circuit also reiterated that ERISA fiduciaries
must discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the plan
participants and beneficiaries. See id. at 628-29. ERISA fiduciaries must comply
with the common law duty of loyalty which includes the obligation to deal fairly
and honestly with all plan members. See id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 506 (1996)); accord Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 761
(D.N.H. 1997) (citing Shea, 107 F.3d at 628 and Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919
F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
201. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
202. See Bixier, 12 F.3d at 1300.
203. See id.; accord Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund
v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1180 (3d Cir. 1996).
204. See Jordan v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (3d Cir.
1997).
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205

Other factors include whether
from a participant's point of view.
206 the
and
of
ERISA,
disclosure violates any other specific disclosure provision
itself. 20 7
whether the harm is caused by the plan fiduciary
1.

Application to 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses
a.

Duty of Knowledge
The PrudentMan Rule--A Fiduciary
208

In addition to the exclusive benefit rule, ERISA fiduciaries must
comply with section 404(a) (1) (B) of ERISA, commonly referred to as the
prudent man or prudent expert rule.2 9 The prudent man rule requires
an ERISA fiduciary to discharge his duties "with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in°
like aims..21
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
The prudent man rule has been characterized in a manner which can be
consistently applied in all cases.2 1 1 However, the rule has been mainly utilized in cases regarding plan investment decisions by plan fiduciaries.12
The prudent man rule incorporates a fiduciary duty to make an in213
dependent inquiry into the merits of a particular investment decision.
The DOL regulations identify the following specific factors that a fiduciary
should take into consideration when conducting the requisite independent investigation (the list does not purport to be exclusive): (1) portfolio
diversification; (2) the liquidity needs of the plan; (3) the projected return of the investment portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the
plan; and (4) the opportunity for gain and the risk of loss associated with
214
These factors require a fiduciary
the investment under consideration.
designed to further the
is
reasonably
investment
whether
the
to determine

205. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
206. See Jordan, 116 F.3d at 1010-11.
207. See Shea, 107 F.3d at 628-29.
208. See supraPart IV.A.
209. See ERISA§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994); see alsoJoseph R. Simone,
Statutory Framework, "Language," And Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of ERISA, 340
PLI/TAX, July-Aug. 1993, at 499, 522.

210.
211.

ERISA§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
See Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis.

1979).

212. See Eccles, supra note 65, at 37 (providing list of cases dealing with plan
investment decisions decided through application of the prudent man rule).
213.

See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Un-

der ERISA, as well as at common law, courts have focused the inquiry under the

'prudent man' rule on a review of the fiduciary's independent investigation of the
merits of a particular investment decision, rather than on an evaluation of the
merits alone.").
214. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (b) (2) (1998).
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purposes of the plan. 5
Courts have developed other key principles in characterizing the
duty of prudence.
These principles include:
(1)..a fiduciary's lack of fa.. ..
. .
216
miliarity 217
with investments is no excuse;
(2) subjective good faith is not a
defense; and (3) the standard is not one of a prudent layperson but one
218
of a prudent fiduciary with experience dealing with similar situations.
Moreover, an ERISA fiduciary has an affirmative obligation to seek independent advice when it lacks the requisite education, experience and
skill.2 9 These
principles apply to plan administration and plan manage22 0
ment alike.

i.

FiduciaryKnowledge of PlanFees and Expenses

Although participants in participant-directed
account
•
.
.
221 plans select the
investment alternative(s) for their retirement monies, plan fiduciaries
initially select the investment options ultimately available to section 404(c)
222
plan participants.
Section 404(c) plan fiduciaries must comply with the
prudent man rule when selecting the various investment alternatives to be
221
offered under a participant-directed account plan.
Specifically,
"[s]ection 404(c) does not insulate fiduciaries with respect to the selection

.. .224
and monitoring of investment alternatives
The duty of prudence requires an ERISA fiduciary to conduct an in225
Ardependent investigation of the merits of a particular investment.
215. See Lee H. Robinson, Investment Management by Fiduciaries, in ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW 117, 131 (Susan P. Serota ed., 1995 & Supp. 1998). Generally, the
purpose of a retirement plan, regardless of the type, is to provide retirement income. See CONISON, supranote 45, at 36.
216. See Marshall v. Glass/Metal Assoc. & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension
Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980) (stating that if fiduciaries commit a
pension plan's assets to investments which they do not understand, they will be
judged according to the standards of others acting in a similar capacity in such
matters).
217. See Donovan, 716 F.2d at 1467 (stating that "a pure heart and an empty
head are not enough").
218. See Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
219. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1982).
220. See Dell, supranote 65, at 97.
221. See Reish &Ashton, supra note 23, at 10.
222. See id.
223. See Nell Hennessy & Frank Daniele, Participant-DirectedRetirement Plans
UnderSection 404(c), in ERISA FIDuciARY LAw 175, 176 (Susan P. Serota ed., 1995 &
Supp. 1998).
224. Susan P. Serota, Overview of ERISA FiduciaryLaw, in ERISA FIDuCARY LAW
9, 12 (Susan P. Serota ed., 1995 & Supp. 1998).
225. See Conner v. Mid S. Ins. Agency, 943 F. Supp. 647, 658 (W.D. La. 1995)
(holding that the plan fiduciaries failed to make a proper investigation of the merits of offering to plan participants the opportunity to invest in the stock of the
closely-held company).
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guably, a fiduciary has knowledge of the fees and expenses charged
against participant accounts and the effect such fees and expenses have
on account balances. Regardless, courts require that plan fiduciaries seek
advice if they lack the requisite knowledge.
requires fiduciaries to act
Additionally, the exclusive purpose rule
28
of the plan.
solely for the purpose of defraying the reasonable expenses
Arguably, a plan fiduciary apprizes itself of the fees and expenses to be
charged to participant accounts in order to determine whether such fees
and expenses are reasonable.

b.

Harm to Plan Participants

9
Plan fees substantially threaten retirement account balances. 2 2 The
problem arises from the shift in responsibility (from employer to employees) for the payment of plan fees and expenses. 2 ° Plan participants are
a substantial portion of plan costs in participant-directed acnow paying 231
Section 404(c) fiduciaries decide the investment options
count plans.
available under a section 404(c) plan 232 and the extent to which plan par233
Like the danger to health maintenance organiticipants pay plan costs.
234
zation plan participants in Shea, the danger to 401 (k) plan participants'
well being with respect to their retirement income is created by the plan

Additionally, before this article went to press, the DOL released a brochure entitled U.S. DOL, A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees.. .for Employers. See PWBA Press
Release: Labor Secretary Herman Announces New Disclosure Information on 401(k) Fees
[07/15/99) (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.dol.gov/dol/opa/ public/media/press/pwba/pwb99191.htm>. The new brochure explicitly informs
employers that in offering a participant-directed retirement plan an employer is
required to consider the costs of the plan when fulfilling its duty to act prudently
and solely in the interest of plan participants upon its selection of investment options and service providers, and its prospective monitoring of both. See U.S. DOL,
A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees... for Employers (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.dol.
gov/dol/pwba/public/pubs/401kt799.htm>. Furthermore, at the DOL's request,
the American Bankers Association, the American Council of Life Insurance, and
the Investment Company Institute joined together to create a 401(k) Plan Fee Disclosure Form (available at <www.dol.gov/dol/pwba>; <www.aba.com>; <www.acli.
corn>; or <www.ici.org>) to assist employers in fulfilling their fiduciary duty to obtain fee information as part of their independent investigation of the merits of an
investment. See PWBA PressRelease, supra.
226. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
227. See supraPart V.A.
228. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A) (ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (ii) (1994).
229. See supra Part I.B. and accompanying notes.
230. See id.
231. See Economic Systems, Inc., supranote 44, § 3.6.
232. See id. § 3.5.2.
233. See id. § 3.6. The trend has been to shift expenses from the employer to
the employee. See id.
234. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary itself.
The effect of plan fees and expenses are exacerbated, in part, by the
lack of affirmative disclosure of fee and expense information by plan fiduciaries.2 35
Without affirmative disclosure, plan participants lack the
awareness necessary to request fee and expense information 236 that can
negatively impact their retirement account balances or make decisions
with the knowledge necessary to understand and accept the financial consequences
of investing in investment options with higher fees and ex237
penses.
c.

Information is a MaterialAspect of Benefits under the Plan

Like other types of retirement plans, section 404(c) plans are established for the purpose of providing retirement income to plan partici238
pants and beneficiaries.
One of the key elements of a 401
239 (k) plan is taxdeferred compounding on contributions and earnings.
Plan fees and
240
expenses assessed against participant accounts reduce account balances
and investment earnings.
Fees and expenses vary between the investment alternatives offered and may be imposed on investment transac242
tions.
Participants can manipulate the fees assessed against their accounts through the selection of investment alternatives (selecting lowercost versus
higher-cost funds) and the frequency of investment transac243
tions.
Consequently, fees and expenses are a material aspect of benefits
in a participant-directed account plan because fees and expenses are factors, which directly effect the account balance available at retirement.

235. See Associated Press, Feds Offer Free 401(k) Information, TELEGRAPH HERALD,
Aug. 9, 1998, Business, at d3. Other concerns include non-disclosure of fees and
expenses to employers and plan sponsors, and excessively high fees being charged
to 401 (k) plans. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. Labor Secretary Holds PWBA Hearings
On 401(k) Fees, 1997 Andrews Pens. Fund Litig. Rep. 8132, Dec. 11, 1997.
236. See supraPart III.B.2.b and accompanying notes.
237. See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, § 3.7. In its study, the Department of Labor addressed the question of whether plan participants would demand
so many optional features in their plans if they knew how much those features
cost. See id. The study found that 85% of the participants that responded to the
survey preferred greater investment returns over more services from their plans.
See id.
238. See CONISON, supra note 45, at 36.
239. See Richard S. Teitelbaum, How Your 401(k) Can Make You Rich, FORTUNE,
1995, Investor's Guide, at 8.
240. See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, § 3.2.
241. See Bamhart, supra note 42, at 3.
242. See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, § 3.5.3.
243. See id.
244. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
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d. Information is Materialfrom Participants'Pointof View
245
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp.,
opined that "Congress's main purpose in imposing a disclosure requirement on ERISA fiduciaries was to ensure that 'employees [would have]
sufficient information and data to enable them to know whether the plan
was financially sound and being administered as intended.'" 2 4 The issue
before the court was whether an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to disclose
pre-adoption deliberations and discussions of proposed plan changes. 247
Concluding that Congress' purpose was not frustrated by permitting plan
fiduciaries to keep their pre-adoption deliberations and discussions se248
cret, the court observed that such a bright-line rule protects the interests of beneficiaries who will receive information at the earliest point at
which their rights can possibly be affected.249
In contrast to the plan amendment pre-adoption deliberation information at issue in Pocchia, plan fee and expense information is not received by plan participants at the earliest point at which their rights can
possibly be affected. Arguably, the rights of participants in participantdirected account plans are affected by plan fees and expenses as each dollar is invested and as each investment transaction occurs. Whether by di250
rect deduction or lower investment returns, the eroding effects of fees
and expenses compound to
251 deliver a potentially substantial blow to retirement income over time.
Thus, a reasonable participant aware of the
substantially negative impact of fees and expenses would likely consider
fees and expenses as a factor when selecting investment alternatives under
the plan and conducting transactions in his retirement account. Permitting section 404(c) fiduciaries to refrain from affirmative disclosure of
plan fees and expenses likely thwarts Congress' main purpose in imposing
a disclosure requirement52 on ERISA fiduciaries: to protect participants in
employee benefit plans.2
Further, failure to affirmatively disclose section 404(c) plan fees and
expenses precludes participants from determining whether section 404(c)
fiduciaries are administering the plan as intended. For example, a plan
fiduciary may select an investment option for the plan that charges exorbitant fees and expenses (because the fiduciary personally likes the fund or
a key executive of the employer personally likes the fund). Such an investment selection may be in violation of the exclusive purpose rule to de-

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 279.
See id. at 278.
See id. at 279.
See id.
See supra notes 4244 and accompanying text.
See supraPart I.B.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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fray the reasonable expenses of the plan 25 and the prudent man rule to
act with care and prudence on behalf of plan participants.254 Arguably,
participants are unable to "police" plan fiduciaries to enforce fiduciary
compliance with the requirements of ERISA section 404 without affirmative disclosure of fee and expense information.
In sum, both the exclusive purpose rule and the prudent man rule
require fiduciary knowledge of fees and expenses. Plan fees and expenses
deliver a harmful blow to255the availability of retirement income of section
404(c) plan participants.
Adequate knowledge of plan fees and expenses can potentially enable participants to minimize their impact. A
reasonable participant would likely consider fees and expenses as a factor
256
in his retirement investment decision-making.
Arguably, an ERISA section 404(c) plan fiduciary knows that silence about plan fees and expenses
might be harmful. Therefore, the common law of trusts' affirmative duty
to disclose when the fiduciary knows that silence might be harmful likely
applies to plan fee and expense disclosure.
V. COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO ERISA SECTION
404(C)
Courts that have addressed the issue are split on the application of
the affirmative fiduciary disclosure obligations implicit within ERISA section 404(a) to specific statutory disclosure obligations enumerated elsewhere in the Act. Some courts adhere to the principle that specific stat257
utes control over general statutes.
Under this principle, courts
generally have held that it is inappropriate to infer an unlimited disclosure obligation on
•258 the basis of general fiduciary provisions that say nothing about disclosure.

253.

254.
255.
256.
panying
257.

See ERISA § 404(a) (1) (A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (ii) (1994).

SeeERISA§ 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a) (1) (B).
See supraPart I.B and accompanying notes.
See Economic Systems, Inc., supra note 44, § 3.7; see also supra text accomnote 170; supra note 239.
See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the CWA/ITU Negotiated Pension Plan v.

Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding it "inappropriate to infer an

unlimited disclosure obligation on the basis of general provisions that say nothing
about disclosure"); Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 661 (4th Cir.

1996) (stating that general duties under ERISA section 404 can be no broader
than the specific duty to disclose under section 104(b) (4)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
738 (1997); Anderson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 66 F.3d 956, 956 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the provisions of an IRS publication trumped ERISA regarding notice requirements); Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the general language of a statute will not apply to a
matter dealt with specifically in another part of the same statute).
258. See Weinstein, 107 F.3d at 147; see also Faircloth,91 F.3d at 661; Weiss, 972 F.
Supp. at 754.
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2 59
However, the Ninth Circuit, in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises,
observed
that a fiduciary's duties under section 404(a) (1) (A) (exclusive purpose
rule) may in some circumstances extend to additional disclosures beyond
those specified in a particular
section of ERISA where the interests of the
260
beneficiaries so require.
In Acosta, the question before the court was
whether a plan trustee has a fiduciary duty under ERISA section 404(a) to
provide a list of names, addresses, and shareholdings owned by each plan
participant to an individual participant. 26 1 Under general common law of
trust principles incorporated within section 404(a), the court found that
the requested disclosure must be sufficiently related to the provision of
benefits or the defrayment of expenses in order to create a fiduciary duty
to disclose that reaches beyond disclosure provisions enumerated else262
where in the Act.
The court read the common law of trust disclosure
duties into ERISA through section 404(a) but only to the extent that disclosures relate to the provision of benefits or the defrayment of ex263
penses.
Disclosure of information under common law principles must
264
not contradict or supplant existing disclosure provisions.
Relying on the Varity and Bixler decisions, the Third Circuit, in Jor265
dan, opined that:

[s]atisfaction by an employer as plan administrator of its statutory disclosure obligations under ERISA does not foreclose the
possibility that the plan administrator may nonetheless breach
its fiduciary duty owed plan participants to communicate candidly, if the plan administrator simultaneously or subsequently
makes material misrepresentations to those whom the duty of
loyalty and prudence are owed.
The court concluded that fiduciary duties operate both independently from 267
and in conjunction with ERISA's specifically delineated requirements.
Arguably, the Acosta and Jordan decisions create an inter-

259.
260.

950 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 618.

261.

See id. at 614-15. The participant requested the information in order to

solicit votes in the parent company's corporate directors election. See id. at 615.
Acosta, like the other plan participants, owned common stock in one of Pacific
Enterprises' subsidiaries through the subsidiary's retirement savings plan. See id.
262. See id. at 618-19.
263. See id. at 618.
264. See id.
265. 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997).
266. Id. at 1012 (quoting In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA"
Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995)).
267. See Jordan, 116 F.3d at 1012 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court also
made this determination in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 489 (1996)).
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play between general fiduciary disclosure principles derived from the
common law of trusts and other statutory disclosure obligations under
ERISA.
A.

Interests of ParticipantsRequire Disclosure

Current disclosure of after-cost (net) rates of return 26 are, arguendo,
misleading communications or misrepresentations by ERISA section
269
404(c) plan fiduciaries. As illustrated above, plan fees and expenses
charged against participant accounts can
270 have a substantial negative impact on retirement account balances.
The interest of participants in
participant-directed account plans is the accumulation of retirement income.
With retirement income at stake, participant interests require
disclosure of plan fee and expense information.
B.

Sufficiently Related to Provision of Benefits orDefrayment of Expenses

ERISA is concerned mainly with protecting employees' benefit inter272
ests and expectations.
A benefit refers
. 273to a participant's or beneficiary's
right to receive monies from the plan.
Plan information is subject to
disclosure if it relates to the provision of benefits or will aid participants
274
and beneficiaries in monitoring the plan's management.
Fees and expenses reduce the amount of benefits available at retirement.
Because of this
fees
... effect,. plan
.
.276and expenses directly relate to
the provision of benefits in participant-directed account plans.
Plan fee
and expense information is also directly related to defrayment of expenses. Under the exclusive purpose rule, a fiduciary has the duty to act
solely in the interest of defraying the reasonable expenses of the plan.277
For participants of section 404(c) plans, the defrayment of expenses issue
is arguably related to participants' ability to monitor fiduciary management of a plan. Without full and affirmative disclosure of fee and expense
information, plan participants are precluded from determining fiduciary
mismanagement. They are not adequately informed about fees and ex-

268.

See supra Part [V.A and accompanying notes.
269. See supra Part I.B.
270. See id.
271. See CONISON, supra note 45, at 36. To a participant, a plan is a "source of
retirement financial security." Id.
272. See CONISON, supra note 45, at 72.
273. See Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 619 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Comm. v. Administrator of Hughes NonBargaining Retirement Plan, 72 F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Acosta, 950
F.2d at 619)).
274. See Hughes, 72 F.3d at 694.
275. See supraPart I.B.
276. See id.
277. SeeERISA§ 404(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
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penses or their effects in order to request the appropriate information or
determine fiduciary abuse in the selection and management of plan assets
and service providers. Arguably, the inability to determine fiduciary mismanagement may preclude claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty under
the exclusive purpose rule and deny participants of remedies available
under ERISA.
C. DisclosureDoes Not Contradictor SupplantExisting Disclosure
Provisions
1.

Structure of ERISA Section 404

ERISA fiduciary duties and standards of conduct are generally set
279
Within the overall provision of section
forth in section 404 of the Act.
404,280 section 404(c) carves out an exemption from certain fiduciary liabilto the standards of conduct
does not create an exception
ity.
Section 404(c)
"281
....
Thus, fiduciary duties explicand duties imposed on ERISA fiduciaries.
itly enumerated in sections 404 (a) (1) (A) (the exclusive purpose rule) and
404(a) (1) (B) (the prudent man rule) of ERISA, and any implied duties of
disclosure derived from the common law of trusts apply to fiduciaries of
section 404(c) plans.
2.

Text of Departmentof Labor Section 404(c) Regulations

Erosion of retirement account balances by plan fees and expenses in
Assessment
section 404(c) plans did not exist when ERISA was enacted.
of fees and expenses against participant accounts (and the extent such
Arguably, the fee
fees and expenses are assessed) is a recent practice.

278. See generally ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109. Remedies for a breach of iduciary duty include monetary relief, equitable relief, and removal of the breaching fiduciary. See id. Monetary relief may include restitution, disgorgement of
profits, and consequential damages. See CONISON, supra note 45, at 253. Equitable
relief may include injunctions, rescission and constructive trusts. See id. Whether
punitive damages are available is still an open question. See id.
279. See ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
280. SeeERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. 111996).
281. See id.

282.

In 1974, defined benefit plans were the dominant form of pension cover-

age. See Keville, supra note 14, at 529. Internal Revenue Code Section 401(k)

(which created 401 (k) plans) was enacted in 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-600, Title I,
§ 135(a), 92 Stat. 2785. Section 404(c) was enacted as part of the original Congressional schema that became ERISA. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18).
However, the DOL regulations that set forth the disclosure requirements particular to section 404(c) plans were not adopted until October 1992, almost ten years
after ERISA's enactment. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1998).
283. See, e.g., supranote 45 and accompanying tables.
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and expense disclosure at issue here was not deliberately excluded from
the congressional schema in order to protect section 404(c) plan fiduciaries from conflicting directives which would affect their disclosure judgments while attempting to limit liability.
The text of the DOL regulations provide a compelling argument for
affirmative disclosure of all plan fees and expenses:
[A] participant or beneficiary will not be considered to have
sufficient investment information unless... [the] participant or
beneficiary is provided by an identified plan fiduciary (or a person or persons designated by the plan fiduciary to act on his
behalf), either directly or upon request ....
284
This language mandates affirmative disclosure when the circumstances
warrant disclosure. The declared congressional policy of ERISA requires
disclosure and reporting of financial information to participants and
beneficiaries in the protection of the their interests through the establishment of
2 85standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation of plan
fiduciaries.
Additionally, Congress expressly intended that the common
law 286
of trusts...determine the scope of ERISA plan fiduciary powers and duties -duties • . that arise from the . general
fiduciary
principles
implicit
.
287
within the fundamental duty of undivided loyalty.
These duties include
an affirmative duty to disclose truthful information2 88 and an affirmative
duty to disclose when the plan fiduciary knows that silence might be
harmful. 289 Under ERISA federal common law, the United States Supreme Court has read the affirmative duty to disclose material plan or
benefit information into section 404 of ERISA.
Arguably, the text of the
section 404(c) regulations binds a section 404(c) fiduciary to affirmatively
disclose fee and expense information when either of the common law duties of affirmative disclosure are implicated.
In sum, the threat to interests of participants in participant-directed
account plans requires affirmative fee and expense disclosure. Fee and
expense information is sufficiently related to both the provision of benefits and the defrayment of expenses to warrant affirmative disclosure to
plan participants and beneficiaries. Affirmative disclosure of fees and expenses does not contradict or supplant the existing disclosure provisions

284. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (2) (i) (B) (emphasis added).
285. SeeERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b) (1994).
286. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
287. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.
288.

See id.

289.
290.

See supraPart IV.B and accompanying notes.
See supranotes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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of ERISA section 404(c). In contrast, the structure of section 404 of the
Act and the explicit language of the section 404(c) regulations mandate
application of common law of trust principles to fee and expense disclosure. A section 404(c) plan fiduciary must act within the standards of
conduct and general fiduciary principles imposed by the common law of
trusts implicit within ERISA section 404 even while claiming limited relief
from fiduciary liability under section 404(c).
VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA was designed in part to address adequate communication to
plan participants. ....
ERISA imposes standards of conduct,
responsibilities,
292
and obligations on plan fiduciaries-those persons
controlling employee benefit plans.
The Act holds fiduciaries personally liable for the
breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation owed to the plan or plan
participants and beneficiaries.2 9 4 Section 404(c) of the Act, however, limits personal liability for section 404(c9plan fiduciaries if certain administrative and disclosure criteria are met.
Participant-directed account plans are commonly found in Internal
296
Revenue Code section 401(k) plans.
The number of participants in
401 (k) plans has increased dramatically since ERISA's enactment in
1974.197 Total 401 (k) plan assets have topped one trillion dollars. 298 The
significance of these plans is undeniable as this country continues to face
cuts in Social Security and Medicare benefits and as employers and employees strive to make up the difference.2 9
A one percent difference in fees and expenses has the potential to
300
retard retirement account balances by twenty-eight percent, which has a
substantial negative impact on the accumulation of private retirement
301
benefits.
Implications of fiduciary disclosure obligations and duties are
reasonable in light of the effect of fees and expenses.
Courts are charged with the responsibility for defining the scope of a
fiduciary's disclosure duties since ERISA does not enumerate or elaborate
on that duty in any detail 3°2 and because Congress invoked the common
law of trusts to define the general scope of fiduciary responsibility rather
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See supra notes 7-8.
See supra note 54.
See ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
See ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
SeeERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. 111996).
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19-21.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supranote 40, Pt. 2.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996).
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than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of an ERISA fidu303
ciary.
As a result, courts are developing ajurisprudence in fiduciary disclosure obligations.
This jurisprudence currently includes an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information
and an affirmative
fiduciary duty to disclose information when the fiduciary knows that its silence might harm participants and beneficiaries.3 0 6 Common law fiduciary principles may compel disclosure that reaches beyond specific statutory disclosure obligations explicitly enumerated elsewhere in the Act.30 7
Current
disclosure of fee and expense information
is often mis50931
leading
and harmful to participants
in participant-directed account
plans.. The
of responsibility
to plan participants to procure re. delegation
311
..
tirement 312
income,
the potentially substantial negative impact of fees and
expenses,
the structure of ERISA section 404 and the role of section
33 .
314
war404(c),
and the explicit language of the Department regulations
rant application of the evolving jurisprudence of affirmative fiduciary disclosure obligations to plan fee and expense disclosure in ERISA section
404(c) plans.
Moreover, fundamental in the common law of trusts is the principle
that courts will give beneficiaries of a trust the remedies necessary for the
315
protection of their interests.
Similarly, Congress intended that courts
apply the rule of liberal construction in the interpretation of the various
provisions....of ERISA
316 in order to protect the interests of participants and
their beneficiaries.
Courts must find that an affirmative fiduciary duty

303. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
304. SeeJordan v. Federal Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1013 (3d Cir. 1997).
305. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes.
306. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
307. See supra Part V and accompanying notes.
308. See supra Part IV.A.
309. See id.
310. See supra Part IV.B.
311. See Keville, supra note 14, at 528-29.
312. See supra Part I.B.
313. See supra Part V.
314. See id.
315. See Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1299 (3d Cir. 1993).
316. See, e.g., Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 403 (S.D. Ala. 1982)
("ERISA is a comprehensive remedial statute enacted for the purpose of protecting the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries, and preserving the integrity
of plan assets."); Sirkin v. Phillips Colleges, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D.N.J.
1991) (recognizing that courts liberally construe ERISA in favor of protecting employee participants in benefit plans where courts are required to fill in the gaps of
the ERISA scheme); Gilliarn v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D.N.J. 1980)
("ERISA is a comprehensive remedial statute primarily designed to protect individual rights [and] should be given a liberal construction to safeguard the inter-
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to disclose fee and expense information to participants in section 404(c)
plans does exist pursuant to the common law of trusts and principles implicit within section 404 of ERISA. s 7 To find otherwise thwarts ERISA's
policy to protect the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans
318
tu
dn
i .
through disclosure of financial information.

ests of [plan] participants and beneficiaries and to preserve the integrity of [plan]
assets.").
317. Courts must find an affirmative duty to disclose fees and expenses if and
when a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty is alleged against a plan fiduciary for:
(1) the failure to disclose truthful information, or (2) the failure to affirmatively
disclose fees and expense information when the fiduciary has knowledge that fees
and expenses cause harm yet remain silent. "High-cost 401 (k)s are a lawsuit waiting to happen." Wang, supra note 44, at 96 (quoting "David Wray, president of the
Profit-Sharing/401 (k) Council of America, a trade group for employers with
401 (k)s. .. ").
318. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
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